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ABSTRACT 
Prisoners bring over twenty percent of the civil cases filed in federal 
district courts, predominantly seeking redress for violations of their 
civil rights, or release from prison under habeas corpus. Because most 
prisoners (around ninety-three percent) proceed pro se in their federal 
civil litigation, they are already at a disadvantage. The deck is stacked 
against prisoner plaintiffs in other systemic ways. Local rules, general 
orders, and even district courts’ job postings suggest that when a 
plaintiff is a pro se prisoner the plaintiff is denied an Article III judge. 
Judicial tasks that must be performed in prisoners’ cases, from 
administration to adjudication, are delegated to nonjudicial staff. As a 
result, in the very same federal courthouse, prisoners’ cases are 
decided by a court employee who works as part of the court’s “pro se 
staff,” while all other plaintiffs’ cases are decided by an Article III 
judge (or at least a magistrate judge, if they consent). The Supreme 
Court’s 2015 Wellness International Network v. Sharif decision drew 
attention to delegation of Article III claims to non-Article III judges in 
the bankruptcy realm. In that case, the Court rigorously considered the 
impact of the structural error caused by delegation to judges who do 
not enjoy fixed salaries or life tenure. But delegation of the judicial 
power in the prisoner litigation context is still hiding in plain sight. 
This Article is the first to investigate the scope of the delegation to 
pro se staff and to consider corresponding separation of powers 
concerns. Local procedure that delegates this deciding judicial power 
to pro se staff has gone too far. Local procedure crafts rules for 
prisoner litigation that conflict with federal law, effectively denying 
access to an Article III judge. When federal courts overreach in this 
manner, their rulemaking exceeds the limited rulemaking authority 
Congress has delegated to the judiciary. This local procedure also 
violates federal policy, which generally disfavors allowing nonjudicial 
actors to perform judicial tasks. 
This Article concludes with recommendations about how to solve the 
delegation problem. The strongest solution would be to eliminate the 
local procedures in question and the pro se staff they create. Congress 
would be required to address the issue directly and nationwide by 
creating, or not, additional procedure for prisoner litigation. A more 
moderate approach would publicize the identity of pro se staff as well 
as the nature of the work the staff undertakes and would allow for a 
review procedure similar to that afforded to litigants who proceed in 
front of magistrate judges. Either proposal would bring pro se staff out 
of the shadows of federal litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
magine two plaintiffs, one incarcerated and one free. Each plaintiff 
files a complaint on the same day in the same federal district court. 
Each complaint alleges a procedural due process claim clearly arising 
under federal law and unquestionably appropriate for federal 
jurisdiction. Do these two plaintiffs, one incarcerated and one free, 
have an equal chance at having the claims in their complaints decided 
by a federal judge? 
The instinctual answer may be “of course.” The only real choice with 
respect to who decides the fate of a particular civil claim in federal 
court is the decision to either consent to magistrate judge adjudication 
or to accept the default federal court adjudicator assignment: an Article 
III district judge.1 However, the research undertaken in connection with 
this Article suggests that complaints alleging the same kind of claim, 
filed on the same day in the same federal district court, may not be 
decided by the same type of adjudicator. 
Imagine that the plaintiffs in question each file a complaint in the 
District of Arizona. If the case is brought by a prisoner, it is 
automatically assigned to “the Staff Attorneys’ Office.”2 The Staff 
Attorneys’ Office “administer[s]” all civil cases brought by prisoners.3 
There is no local rule that assigns a non-prisoner’s complaint, alleging 
the same claim as the prisoner’s complaint, to a Staff Attorneys’ Office. 
Of course, administration by the Staff Attorneys’ Office may not 
mean adjudication by the Staff Attorneys’ Office. Yet a position 
description advertising a staff attorney opening in the District of 
Arizona explains that the person selected for the position “will perform 
substantive review, research, and writing in prisoner civil rights and 
habeas corpus cases.”4 This position description suggests that staff 
attorneys assigned to prisoners’ civil cases are reaching the merits of 
prisoner claims. 
Still, this practice may be only slightly different from what occurs in 
federal judges’ chambers around the country: a nonjudicial actor, 
typically a law clerk, makes a recommendation in a particular case, 
sometimes a procedural recommendation implicating a hearing date, 
 
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2012) (describing when magistrate judges may decide claims 
brought in federal district courts). 
2 D. ARIZ. L.R. CIV. 16.2(b)(2)(A). 
3 Id. 
4 Job Posting, Pro Se Staff Attorney—Phoenix or Tucson, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE 
DIST. OF ARIZ., http://agency.governmentjobs.com/azduscourts/job_bulletin.cfm?JobID=7 
87543 (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
I
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and sometimes a recommendation that reaches the case’s merits. So 
long as a judge ultimately endorses the recommendation, there is no 
real difference between how a prisoner’s procedural due process claim 
and a non-prisoner’s procedural due process claim will be adjudicated. 
That is, even if the prisoner’s complaint is originally assigned to a Staff 
Attorneys’ Office, any staff attorney recommendation will later be 
endorsed or rejected by a judge. As a result, if this is true, then the staff 
attorney and his or her work product is effectively supervised by a 
judge. 
In reality, staff attorneys may not be directly supervised by judges. 
For example, the District of Arizona position description states that the 
staff attorney ultimately hired “will be supervised by the Senior Staff 
Attorney.”5 At the time this Article was written, the senior staff 
attorney in the District of Arizona was James McKay. McKay is a 
respected federal court employee who, in addition to his role as senior 
staff attorney, sits on the Ninth Circuit Pro Se Committee and the 
District of Arizona’s Local Rules Advisory Committee.6 But he is not 
a judge. 
If staff attorneys are reaching the merits of prisoners’ claims and are 
not directly supervised by judges, then a prisoner’s civil case in the 
District of Arizona is effectively administered by the Staff Attorneys’ 
Office. The staff attorney assigned to the prisoner’s case is not limited 
to typically administrative decisions and will reach the merits of the 
prisoner’s claims. The staff attorney will be supervised by a senior staff 
attorney, as opposed to a judge. This creates the possibility that 
adjudication of a complaint filed on the same day in the same federal 
district court will be less likely to be decided by a judge if the complaint 
is filed by a prisoner. 
Returning to the two litigants with the same claim, one imprisoned 
and one free: How else do they differ? A non-prisoner plaintiff who 
wishes to challenge the assignment of his or her case to a magistrate 
judge has very specific procedural mechanisms through which he or 
she may do so.7 Federal law is also very protective of a party’s right to 
 
5 Id. 
6 Presenter Biographies, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF ARIZ., http://www.azd 
.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/%5BB%5D%20Presenter%20Biographies.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2016). I met Mr. McKay when I worked as a law clerk in the District 
of Arizona. However, this Article is based on independent research, not my experiences as 
a law clerk. 
7 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (describing how parties will be notified if a magistrate judge is 
“designated to exercise civil jurisdiction” and how the parties will be advised “that they are 
free to withhold consent without adverse substantive consequences”). 
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challenge assignment to a magistrate judge. If a court rule refers a civil 
matter to a magistrate judge, there must also be “procedures to protect 
the voluntariness of the parties’ consent” to that referral.8 Magistrate 
judges’ findings are subject to review by a district court judge de novo.9 
That is, any magistrate judge decision is potentially subject to an 
additional round of scrutiny by an Article III judge. 
By contrast, a prisoner whose case is assigned to nonjudicial court 
staff has no procedure through which he or she can challenge the 
assignment. There is no federal law or District of Arizona local rule 
requiring the creation of procedures that would protect a prisoner’s 
right to consent to or reject assignment to nonjudicial court staff. Nor 
is there a federal law or District of Arizona local rule describing how a 
decision made by nonjudicial court staff can trigger the kind of de novo 
review a non-prisoner plaintiff is entitled to receive. 
But how will a prisoner know that his or her case has been assigned 
to a staff attorney? To know that this kind of assignment occurs in the 
District of Arizona, the prisoner would have to be aware of the 
existence and understand the purpose of local rules of civil procedure. 
To know exactly what staff attorneys are doing, and who supervises 
their work, the prisoner would need to locate and search federal court 
job databases and other obscure district court online material. It is not 
a stretch to state that most prisoners will not be able to locate that same 
information. 
The two hypothetical plaintiffs introduced in this section filed a 
complaint on the same day in the same federal district court and alleged 
the same claim. However, if one of them is incarcerated, there is a 
chance that the incarcerated plaintiff’s claim will not be adjudicated by 
a federal judge. These two plaintiffs’ cases will potentially be resolved 
in very different ways. Incarcerated plaintiffs are important players in 
federal litigation. Over twenty percent of the civil cases filed in federal 
court last year were brought by prisoners,10 making prisoner cases the 
second most prevalent category of federal civil cases.11 In nearly all 
 
8 Id. 
9 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 
10 U.S. COURTS, TABLE C-13—CIVIL PRO SE AND NON PRO SE FILINGS (Sept. 30, 2014), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-13/judicial-business/2014/09/30 [hereinafter 
TABLE C-13]. 
11 See U.S. COURTS, TABLE C-2—CIVIL STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY (June 30, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-2/statistical-tables     
-federal-judiciary/2015/06/30 [hereinafter TABLE C-2] (listing cases that constitute 
“prisoner petitions”); see also Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civil Caseload of the 
Federal District Courts, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1177, 1211–15 (2015). The Administrative 
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such cases, the prisoners represented themselves.12 This Article 
confronts the role of district courts’ pro se staff. It shines a light on the 
issues created by the delegation of one-fifth of the federal civil docket 
to nonjudicial staff. 
Not only are prisoner cases a significant portion of the federal civil 
docket, these cases might be the most important cases filed in federal 
courts. After all, federal prisoner litigation has been a catalyst for social 
change. Prisoner civil rights actions have forced the country to 
acknowledge the dire conditions in state prisons, where overcrowding 
has caused medical care crises and even inmate death.13 Prisoner civil 
rights actions involving the denial of medical care have triggered frank 
discussions about the necessity of sex reassignment surgery.14 A 
prisoner civil rights action arising out of conditions in the infamous 
Angola prison provided a forum to consider exactly what temperature 
death row inmates’ cells should be kept at during miserably steamy 
Louisiana summers.15 When prisoners bring habeas corpus petitions, 
their litigation has the ability to cure a state’s constitutional error and 
the illegal incarceration it caused. If the Supreme Court decides that a 
decision in a habeas corpus case should be applied retroactively, all 
inmates with similar claims might be freed. 
Prisoner litigation involves exciting and important claims that 
implicate individual liberties and, in the case of habeas corpus 
petitions, freedom itself. Still, the federal courts do not welcome 
prisoner litigation. In response to a recent survey conducted by the 
Federal Judicial Center, the federal district courts’ chief judges 
characterized pro se prisoner cases as matters in which judges “find it 
difficult to discern the merits,” “encounter procedural or logistical 
problems,” or “have to deal with irrational litigants who make demands 
the court cannot meet.”16 These confessions suggest that pro se 
prisoner cases are met with preconceived, and generally negative, 
notions of their worth. 
 
Office of the U.S. Courts compiles statistics about “prisoner petitions,” a category which 
includes prisoners’ civil rights actions and habeas corpus petitions. 
12 TABLE C-13, supra note 10 (indicating that ninety-three percent of such cases were 
brought pro se). 
13 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 501 (2011). 
14 Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
15 Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 589 (5th Cir. 2015). 
16 DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS 
IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: A REPORT ON SURVEYS OF CLERKS OF COURT AND CHIEF 
JUDGES 24–25 (2011), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/proseusdc.pdf/$file 
/proseusdc.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL SURVEY]. 
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Yet the district judges who are concerned about pro se prisoner 
litigation are often not the federal actors who actually deal with pro se 
prisoner litigation. Instead, like the District of Arizona, most federal 
district courts17 assign management of pro se prisoner cases to pro se 
staff—attorneys known as pro se law clerks or pro se staff attorneys. 
Though this method of case assignment is often dismissed as a 
simple and reasonable staffing arrangement, it is really much more. By 
giving pro se staff judicial tasks, the federal district courts are in fact 
delegating away the judicial power in the majority of prisoner civil 
cases. And, because pro se prisoner cases represent such a large 
percentage of the federal civil docket, this phenomenon represents a 
significant reassignment of Article III duties. 
This Article examines the issues raised by delegation of judicial 
tasks to federal district courts’ pro se staff. Following this introduction, 
Part I describes exactly how prisoner litigation is delegated to 
nonjudicial staff. It examines how pro se staff administers prisoners’ 
cases in the Ninth Circuit, and notes how the staff may also be acting 
as the cases’ adjudicators. 18 Part II highlights the disdain lobbed at 
prisoners’ civil litigation and argues that focusing on the kind of claims 
that prisoners bring, and not prisoners themselves, supports the 
conclusion that prisoners’ civil litigation is worthy of a federal forum 
and a federal judge. 
Part III offers a way to analyze the delegation to pro se staff 
described in Part I. It characterizes the delegation as a procedure that 
creates a separation of powers concern. This part demonstrates that the 
local procedure district courts are using to delegate judicial tasks to 
nonjudicial actors is inconsistent with procedure Congress has already 
developed for prisoner litigation. By creating local procedure that is 
inconsistent with federal law, district courts have exceeded the limited 
rulemaking authority Congress has delegated to the federal courts. This 
overreach creates a structural error of significant dimension. 
 
17 Id. at 12 (reporting that eighty-six of the ninety district courts that responded to a 
survey inquiry about the use of pro se staff have such staff). 
18 The research conducted in connection with this Article attempted to mimic, wherever 
possible, the kind of research an actual litigant might undertake when searching for 
information about pro se staff and/or local procedure. I chose not to survey district courts 
about their pro se staff and pro se staff procedure as I perceived some reluctance to divulge 
exactly what responsibilities pro se staff have. Of course, as a law professor and former 
federal law clerk, I have information that a litigant without those experiences does not have. 
Still, I decided that documenting and analyzing the information actually available to the 
public, as opposed to analyzing information a court might provide to a law professor, would 
be ultimately more interesting and insightful. 
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Of course, this Article rests on the premise that prisoner plaintiffs 
are treated differently—and, in most cases, much worse—than parties 
who are not incarcerated. While disparate treatment may suggest a 
possible Equal Protection challenge, it is likely to fail. No court has 
found that pro se civil litigants, or even the narrower category of 
prisoner plaintiffs, are a suspect class.19 Similarly, several courts have 
addressed whether the limits placed on prisoners’ civil litigation burden 
prisoners’ fundamental right to access the courts.20 However, the 
consensus is that the right to access the courts is narrow and not 
impermissibly burdened when legislation limits prisoners’ ability to 
litigate as effectively as possible.21 What is left in the Equal Protection 
context is an argument that the local procedures described herein fail a 
rational basis test.22 It is difficult to imagine a successful Equal 
Protection challenge premised on a rational basis argument in this 
context. Alternatively, characterizing delegation to pro se staff as a 
structural error offers an untested and innovative way to challenge how 
prisoner cases are treated. 
After highlighting the potential for structural error caused by 
delegation to pro se staff, Part IV of this Article contends that 
delegation of judicial tasks to pro se staff violates a robust federal 
 
19 See, e.g., Durham v. Lappin, 346 F. App’x 330, 333 (10th Cir. 2009); Jones v. 
Feliciano, No. 09-3210-SAC, 2009 WL 3473404, at *4 (D. Kan. Oct. 27, 2009); 
Cushenberry v. Fed. Med. Ctr., 530 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913 (E.D. Ky. 2008). 
20 See, e.g., Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 232 (4th Cir. 1997); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 
F.3d 1281, 1288 (6th Cir. 1997); Morrison v. Davis, 88 F. Supp. 2d 799, 804–05 (S.D. Ohio 
2000), amended in part by 195 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (S.D. Ohio 2001); Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F. 
Supp. 1318, 1332 (S.D. Ind. 1997), aff’d, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1997). 
21 Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 42–43 (1st Cir. 2000); see also David C. Fathi, The 
Prison Litigation Reform Act: A Threat to Civil Rights, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 260, 261–62 
(“Courts have consistently rejected equal protection challenges to the PLRA’s limitations 
on damages and attorney fees.”). 
22 See Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 585–86 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Legislation that does 
not burden a suspect class or affect fundamental rights satisfies the equal-protection 
requirement if the legislature could think the rule rationally related to any legitimate goal of 
government. Prisoners are not a suspect class; conviction of crime justifies the imposition 
of many burdens.”); see also Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 11 F. Supp. 2d 586, 602 
(E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that applying PLRA’s provision limiting prisoners’ access to 
prospective relief in a way that other plaintiffs’ access to such relief was not limited did not 
unconstitutionally burden inmates’ fundamental right to access the courts because 
limitations imposed by the PLRA do not close courthouse doors, but instead limit “the form 
and type of relief inmates may be awarded”). See generally Peter Hobart, The Prison 
Litigation Reform Act: Striking the Balance Between Law and Order, 44 VILL. L. REV. 981, 
993 (1999) (“Because courts do not regard the PLRA as burdening a fundamental right and 
do not regard inmates as a suspect class, rational basis review is generally employed. Several 
courts have held that the PLRA meets the low level test rational basis principle.”). 
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policy that forbids delegation of judicial tasks to nonjudicial actors. 
Part V offers solutions to the pro se staff problem, including: the 
elimination of local rulemaking that targets prisoner litigation, as well 
as a more moderate approach that would require making the existence 
of and responsibilities assigned to pro se staff public and subject to 
meaningful review. 
The Article concludes by noting that the rigorous scrutiny that 
accompanies delegation of Article III work to bankruptcy and 
magistrate judges is also necessary in the context of prisoner litigation. 
Delegation of Article III claims to bankruptcy judges reached the 
Supreme Court in 2015’s Wellness International Network, Ltd., v. 
Sharif23 decision, and received rigorous scrutiny in both the thoughtful 
majority and dissenting opinions. Delegation of the judicial power in 
cases in which the plaintiffs happen to be prisoners are deserving of the 
same attention. 
I 
WHO DECIDES PRISONER CASES? 
Prisoner litigation represents a significant portion—almost twenty 
percent—of the federal district courts’ civil docket.24 Before analyzing 
the potential constitutional consequences of the assignment of cases to 
nonjudicial court staff, this Article first describes the history and 
influence of the court employees known as pro se staff. It also explains 
why the work pro se staff does is materially different from the work 
done by elbow law clerks. 
A. The Creation and Expansion of Pro Se Staff Duties 
In 1975, a federal pilot program established “pro se law clerk” 
positions, which allowed district courts flooded with pro se prisoner 
cases to hire attorneys and assign them exclusively to pro se prisoner 
cases.25 Today, most federal district courts employ pro se law clerks,26 
who are sometimes identified as pro se staff attorneys. Certain districts 
have created specific places within a given courthouse in which the pro 
 
23 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2015). 
24 TABLE C-13, supra note 10. 
25 Pro Se Law Clerks: A Valuable Court Resource, U.S. COURTS (Apr. 26, 2011, 1:03 
PM), http://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USFEDCOURTS/bulletins/695a6 (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
26 JUDICIAL SURVEY, supra note 16, at 12. 
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se staff toils, known as Pro Se Offices; there, attorneys work alongside 
other pro se staff on pro se cases.27 
The work done by pro se staff is not well understood. The 
assumption is that they “represent[] people who don’t have 
attorneys.”28 They do not. Pro se staff works for the courts on cases 
involving the unrepresented.29 The staff has specialized knowledge in 
pro se litigation and is well-versed in the law the pro se cases raise. The 
cases sent to pro se staff are not assigned randomly. By creating a 
separate path for pro se cases’ adjudication, the district courts may have 
created de facto pro se courts that do not operate as Article III courts 
typically do.30 
Pro se staff has the potential to make a tremendous impact on the 
outcome of pro se litigation. In the 12-month period ending September 
30, 2014, prisoners filed 60,675 civil cases in federal district courts, a 
number that represents twenty-one percent of all civil cases filed.31 
Over ninety-three percent of the prisoner-brought cases were pro se.32 
Therefore, when prisoner-brought cases are assigned to pro se staff, the 
staff in question is tasked with responsibility for nineteen percent of the 
federal district courts’ civil docket.33 
Moreover, even if pro se staff are not exclusively assigned to 
prisoner cases,34 but instead handle all pro se civil cases, the staff will 
still spend most of its time on prisoner pro se filings as prisoner cases 
represent seventy percent of the total pro se civil docket.35 In the Ninth 
Circuit, 18,194 pro se civil cases were filed in the 12-month period 
ending on September 30, 2014.36 Nearly 13,000 of those pro se cases 
were brought by prisoners.37 
 
27 Geoffrey Donald Petis, Evening Out A Stacked Deck: A Suggestion for Improving 
Judicial Economy and Promoting Prisoner Access to Justice, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 571, 
585–86 (2009). 
28 Pro Se Law Clerks: A Valuable Court Resource, THE THIRD BRANCH: NEWSLETTER 
OF THE FED. COURTS (U.S. Courts, Wash. D.C.), Apr. 2011, at 4–5. 
29 Id. 
30 Petis, supra note 27, at 586 (2009). 
31 TABLE C-13, supra note 10. 
32 Id. (explaining that of 60,675 prisoner civil cases, 56,751 were brought pro se). 
33 See Moore, supra note 11, at 1215 (stating that prisoner-brought cases are “the second 
most prevalent [civil] case type” in federal district courts). 
34 JUDICIAL SURVEY, supra note 16, at 13 (stating that pro se law clerk positions were 
created to assist courts with prisoner cases, but as of 2011, seventy-one percent of the 
districts give pro se law clerks both prisoner and non-prisoner pro se cases). 
35 TABLE C-13, supra note 10. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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B. Pro Se Staff and the Risk of Shadow Judging 
It is difficult to determine exactly what pro se staff are doing; 
however, there are numerous suggestions, hidden in sources as 
disparate as local rules of civil procedure and district court job 
descriptions that pro se staff have assumed arguably judicial tasks. Still, 
exactly what pro se staff does is hard to pinpoint, a fact that only makes 
pro se staff delegation more difficult to challenge. 
It is important to first note that some of the procedure that assigns 
cases and judicial tasks to pro se staff is formal and some is informal. 
The more formal procedural mechanisms include local rules of civil 
procedure and general orders. For example, in the District of Arizona, 
a local rule sends habeas corpus petitions and prisoner civil rights 
actions to the District’s Pro Se Office, which administers the cases.38 
In the District of Nebraska, a general order describes the 
“Responsibilities of the Pro Se Law Clerks.”39 This order explains that 
“[t]he pro se law clerks’ responsibilities are conterminous with the pro 
se docket,” which includes all pro se prisoner cases.40 The pro se law 
clerks’ responsibilities include “address[ing] any non-trial related 
motions that may be pending at the time of the pretrial conference.”41 
The District of Colorado’s local rules refer to a “judicial officer 
designated by the Chief Judge” who “shall review the pleadings of a 
prisoner . . . to determine whether the pleadings should be dismissed 
summarily” for several reasons, including “challenging prison 
conditions” or “asserting claims pertinent to his or her conviction or 
sentence.”42 
However, formal local procedure does not often reveal the full extent 
of what pro se staff does, only hinting at the scope of the staff’s duties. 
A review of local rules and general orders in each district court within 
the Ninth Circuit uncovered only one district, the District of Arizona, 
which formally mentioned the existence of pro se staff.43 
Yet other sources, such as employment position descriptions, 
externship information, local rules committee rosters, and state of the 
court reports revealed that there are pro se staff attorneys or pro se law 
 
38 D. ARIZ. L.R. CIV. 16.2(b)(2)(A). 
39 In Re: Definition of the Pro Se Docket, Responsibilities of the Pro Se Law Clerks, and 




42 D.C. COLO. L. CIV. R. 8.1(a), (b). 
43 See infra Table 2. 
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clerks in the District of Alaska; the Central, Eastern and Southern 
Districts of California; and the Western District of Washington.44 
Though difficult to locate, these sources were generally more specific 
about what pro se staff actually does than local rules or general orders. 
These informal sources provide ways to infer what a district court’s 
local procedure is. 
For example, a position description announcing an opening in the 
Western District of Washington explained that a pro se law clerk 
“provides assistance on prisoner cases including reviewing complaints 
and petitions, conducting necessary research and preparing 
recommendations and non-dispositive orders for the court’s 
approval.”45 In the District of Nevada, a State of the Court report 
explained that pro se staff attorneys “draft orders regarding post-service 
issues: matters relating to discovery, case management, and disposition 
of the case.”46 In the Northern District of California, an “opportunity 
announcement” described the kind of work externs working in the Pro 
Se Department would complete.47 The externs do not work for judges, 
but instead “assist the Pro Se Department staff attorneys in managing 
prisoner habeas corpus and civil rights cases for the court,” and 
“research and draft proposed procedural and dispositive orders in 
prisoners’ cases challenging their convictions and conditions of 
confinement.”48 In the District of Arizona, a position description 
explained that pro se staff attorneys are supervised “by the Senior Staff 
Attorney,” not judges, and “perform substantive review, research, and 
writing in prisoner civil rights and habeas corpus cases.”49 According 
to these sources, pro se staff working in the district courts located 




44 See infra Table 2. 
45 See infra Table 2. 
46 See infra Table 2. 
47 See infra Table 2. 
48 See infra Table 2. 
49 See infra Table 2. 
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Table 1. Identification of Pro Se Staff in Ninth Circuit District Courts: Local 
Rules, General Orders, and/or Court Directories50 
District Local Rule General Order 
Court 
Directory 
Alaska n/a n/a n/a 
Arizona Local Rule 16.251 
General Order 
14-3 n/a 
California Central n/a n/a n/a 
California Eastern n/a n/a n/a 
California Northern n/a n/a n/a 
California Southern n/a n/a n/a 
Guam n/a n/a n/a 
Hawaii n/a n/a n/a 
Idaho n/a n/a n/a 
Montana n/a n/a n/a 
Nevada n/a n/a n/a 
Northern Mariana Islands n/a n/a n/a 
Oregon n/a n/a n/a 
Washington Eastern n/a n/a n/a 
Washington Western n/a n/a n/a 
District courts outside of the Ninth Circuit also have procedures that 
suggest that pro se staff perform judicial tasks. There, as in the Ninth 
Circuit, the best sources for determining what tasks pro se staff are 
actually performing are not formal local rules or general orders but 
rather hard to locate sources such as job postings on federal job search 
Web sites. 
For example, the Local Rules of the United States District Courts for 
the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York make no mention of 
pro se law clerks. However, the Southern District of New York’s Web 
site includes a link to a department identified as the district’s “Pro Se 
Intake Unit.”52 That unit reviews all pro se filings to determine 
 
50 I used the following search terms to locate mentions of pro se staff in local rules, 
general orders, and court directories: “staff attorney,” “pro se,” and “law clerk.” 
51 D. ARIZ. L.R. CIV. 16.2(b)(2)(A). The District of Arizona’s local rule regarding 
“Differentiated Case Management” “screens cases for complexity,” and creates different 
tracks for cases depending upon their perceived complexity. Pro se habeas corpus petitions 
and civil rights actions brought by prisoners are assigned to a “Prisoner Pro Se Track.” Id. 
The Clerk of Court assigns cases to this track based on the “nature of suit,” and the cases 
“are administered by the District’s Prisoner Pro Se Office.” Id. 
52 Representing Yourself in Federal Court (Pro Se), U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. 
OF N.Y., http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtrules_prose.php?prose=office (last visited Oct. 
14, 2016). 
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“compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” before 
docketing them.53 
Similar to district courts’ job postings in the Ninth Circuit, job 
postings outside of the Ninth Circuit are also revealing. The pro se staff 
attorney hired in the Northern District of Texas will “review[] motions 
to proceed in forma pauperis; screen[] prisoner petitions and motions, 
motions to vacate sentence, and civil rights complaints; and assist[] 
judges who preside over [certain] cases . . . with all aspects of prisoner 
case management.”54 
A job posting for a part-time pro se law clerk in the Western District 
of Virginia explains that a pro se law clerk “provide[s] legal advice and 
assistance to the Court in connections [sic] with prisoner petitions and 
complaints” and lists representative job duties as follows: 
• Performs substantive screening after filing of all prisoner and 
inmate petitions and motions, including state habeas corpus petitions, 
motions to vacate sentence, and civil rights complaints. Drafts 
appropriate recommendations and orders for the Court’s signature. 
• Reviews all complaints, petitions, and pleadings that have been 
filed to determine issues involved and basis for relief. 
• Performs research, as required, to assist the Court in preparing 
opinions. 
• Maintains liaison between the Court and litigants. Corresponds 
with other officials, such as U.S. Attorney, as required. 
• Reviews the docket of pending prisoner and inmate litigation to 
assure the proper progress of such cases and advises the Court of 
those cases where action by the Court is appropriate. 
• Compiles statistics and prepares periodic reports, as required, 
which reflect the status and flow of cases. Identifies problem areas, 
makes recommendations, and offer [sic] solutions, as required. 
• Keeps abreast of changes in the law to aid the Court in adjusting to 
new legislation in the pro-se area. 
• Provides information, guidance, and advice to judges, magistrates, 
and other personnel working in the pro-se area. Advises appropriate 
personnel on the status of particular cases.55 
In the Eastern District of Louisiana, a job posting explains that a pro 
se law clerk: 
 
53 Id. 
54 Career Opportunity, Pro Se Staff Attorney #16-02, U.S DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. 
OF TEX. (Oct. 21, 2015) (on file with author). 
55 Position Announcement, Pro Se Law Clerk Part-Time/Temporary, U.S. DIST. COURT 
FOR THE W. DIST. OF VA. (Oct. 2, 2015) (on file with author). 
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• Performs substantive screening after filing of all prisoner and 
inmate petitions and motions, including state habeas corpus petitions, 
motions to vacate sentence, and civil rights complaints. 
• Drafts appropriate recommendations and orders for the Court’s 
signature. 
• Reviews all complaints, petitions, and pleadings that have been 
filed to determine eligibility to proceed in forma pauperis, issues 
involved and basis for relief. 
• Performs research, as required, to assist the Court in preparing 
opinions. 
• Maintains liaison between the Court and litigants. Corresponds 
with other officials, such as U.S. Attorney, as required. 
• Evaluates present procedures to determine new innovations for 
increasing the effectiveness in handling complaints, petitions, and 
pleadings. 
• Reviews the docket of pending prisoner and inmate litigation to 
assure the proper progress of such cases and advises the Court of 
those cases where action by the Court is appropriate.” 
• Compiles statistics and prepares periodic reports, as required, that 
reflect the status and flow of cases. Identifies problem areas, makes 
recommendations, and offers solutions, as required by the Court, 
Administrative Office, and other officials. 
• Keeps abreast of changes in the law to aid the Court in adjusting to 
new legislation in the pro se area. 
• Provides information, guidance, and advice to judges, magistrate 
judges, and other personnel working in the pro se area. Advises 
appropriate personnel on the status of particular cases.56  
A white paper prepared at the request of the Federal Bar Association 
confirms that pro se staff across the country are engaging in judicial 
tasks: “District Judges and Magistrate Judges rely on the court’s pro se 
law clerks and other supporting staff to help process the intake of 
prisoner cases, initially screen the petitions and other papers, and make 
recommendations regarding dismissal.”57 
The most problematic inference arising out of the sources identified 
above is that pro se staff are acting as judges. To the extent the job 
descriptions are subject to other interpretations, it is difficult to confirm 
the truth. This much is true: pro se staff are working on a significant 
 
56 Notice of Position Vacancy, Pro Se Law Clerk (Staff Attorney), U.S. DIST. COURT FOR 
THE E. DIST. OF LA. (Oct. 26, 2015) (on file with author). 
57 PETER G. MCCABE, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGE SYSTEM 54 
(2014). 
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portion of the federal civil docket in ways that at least suggest improper 
delegation of judicial duties. 
C. Pro Se Staff Are Not Elbow Law Clerks 
The work done by pro se staff should not be dismissed on the 
grounds that it is similar to the work done by elbow law clerks. Elbow 
law clerks are clerks who work for one judge in that judge’s chambers. 
Elbow law clerks draft opinions while sitting at a desk located only 
steps away from the judge who ultimately places his or her name on the 
documents originally drafted by the elbow law clerk. In the district 
courts, elbow law clerks are exposed to judges’ entire dockets—from 
securities actions to drug sentencing hearings. If they remain in their 
judges’ chambers for only one year, presumably, no one type of case 
becomes routine. 
The district court staff at issue in this Article are not assigned to a 
particular judge or chambers. Their writing impacts a limited type of 
plaintiff (the unrepresented) in a limited category of case (most often, 
prisoner civil rights or habeas petitions). Even the simple fact of where 
a pro se staff member sits creates greater opportunity for delegation. 
There is less interaction with the judge—both social and professional. 
Judicial supervision decreases. What increases is the chance that pro se 
staff, who toil for years on one kind of case, will become frustrated 
with the typical party who brings that kind of case. Delegation of 
prisoner litigation to pro se staff is unlike the assignment of duties to 
elbow law clerks because it is not as closely supervised by judges and 
is vulnerable to the plaintiff-specific fatigue and cynicism.58 
 
58 Others have eloquently highlighted the federal court reality that elbow law clerks draft 
a significant portion of judicial opinions. In 2014, the Marquette Law Review published a 
symposium issue titled “Judicial Assistants or Junior Judges: The Hiring, Utilization, and 
Influence of Law Clerks,” the first “devoted to the institution of the judicial clerk.” Chad 
Oldfather & Todd C. Peppers, Judicial Assistants or Junior Judges: The Hiring, Utilization, 
and Influence of Law Clerks, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2014). The symposium addressed 
important issues, including “how law clerks are selected, ‘who’ law clerks are, what job 
duties law clerks are assigned, and whether law clerks exercise inappropriate levels of 
influence over the judicial decision-making process.” Id. at 7. The symposium mentioned 
the role of staff attorneys, but only in the appellate courts. See David R. Stras, Secret Agents: 
Using Law Clerks Effectively, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 151, 173 (2014); see also Stephen L. 
Wasby, The World of Law Clerks: Tasks, Utilization, Reliance, and Influence, 98 MARQ. L. 
REV. 111, 113–14 (2014). Pro se staff in the district courts remain at the periphery of federal 
court scholarship. 
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II 
PRISONER LITIGATION DESERVES JUDICIAL ATTENTION 
Prisoner litigation should receive at least the same amount of judicial 
attention all other cases filed in federal court receive. Not only does 
prisoner litigation represent a significant portion of the federal civil 
docket, it has the ability to effect significant social change. For 
example, a 2011 case involving civil rights violations arising out of, 
inter alia, failure to provide adequate medical care to prisoners, 
resulted in an order to relieve extreme overcrowding in California state 
prisons by releasing a significant portion of the state’s prison 
population.59 A recent prisoner civil rights action in the Northern 
District of California granted the prisoner-plaintiff’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction and ordered a California state prison to provide 
the plaintiff with sex reassignment surgery.60 In 2015, the Fifth Circuit 
held that prisoner civil rights claims brought by death row inmates 
incarcerated in Louisiana’s infamous Angola prison supported a 
finding of Eighth Amendment violations due to a failure to provide the 
inmates with air conditioning.61 The prisoner litigation at issue in this 
Article also implicates habeas corpus petitions, whose importance 
cannot be overstated. A writ of habeas corpus guarantees “the 
protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from 
wrongful restraints upon their liberty.”62 
Prisoner-brought cases in the federal district courts, and in particular 
those involving prisoner-brought habeas petitions and civil rights 
claims, are arguably being delegated to non-Article III actors in ways 
that raise the same kind of concerns as those described in Part III.63 Yet 
delegation of prisoner cases is not an issue being litigated in the 
Supreme Court, nor is it the subject of academic scrutiny. This may be 
because the delegation is difficult to confirm.64 Alternatively, 
delegation of the judicial power in prisoner-brought cases may simply 
 
59 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 501 (2011) (explaining that at the time of trial, 
“California’s correctional facilities held some 156,000 persons . . . nearly double the number 
that California’s prisons were designed to hold, and California [had] been ordered to reduce 
its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity,” resulting in a required population 
reduction “as high as 46,000 persons”). 
60 Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
61 Ball, 792 F.3d 584, 589 (5th Cir. 2015) (upholding district court’s holding that failure 
to provide air conditioning on death row constituted an Eighth Amendment violation, but 
remanding for further consideration of the scope of injunctive relief). 
62 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). 
63 See infra Part III. 
64 See infra Part III. 
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be of little interest. After all, when prisoner-brought federal cases 
receive attention, it is usually to decry their perceived lack of merit. 
This Part confronts the criticisms aimed at prisoner ligation and argues 
that prisoner-brought cases are precisely the kind deserving of Article 
III judicial attention. 
A. How Prisoner-Brought Cases Are Perceived 
It is difficult to address prisoner-brought cases without running into 
an avalanche of ill will lobbed at prisoners’ attempts to seek justice 
through civil litigation.65 The most common objections are that there 
are too many prisoner-brought cases66 and that they are all frivolous. 
What makes a claim “frivolous” is typically left unsaid.67 However, 
that a prisoner-brought claim is more likely to be dismissed before trial 
has been cited as evidence of prisoner claims’ lack of merit. For 
example, evidence that only three percent of lawsuits filed by inmates 
in federal court reached trial was enough to support one court’s 
conclusion that “a large portion of prisoner litigation . . . is without 
merit.”68 
 
65 See, e.g., Note: Resolving Prisoners’ Grievances Out of Court: 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 1309, 1309–10 (1991) (“Members of the federal judiciary . . . have 
repeatedly indicated that most, if not all, prisoner petitions are frivolous.”). The academic 
approach is generally forgiving. But see Gail L. Bakaitis DeWolf, Protecting the Courts 
from the Barrage of Frivolous Prisoner Litigation: A Look at Judicial Remedies and Ohio’s 
Proposed Legislative Remedy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 257 (1996) (“[M]ost filings by 
prisoners are frivolous.”); see also Barbara Palmer, The “Bermuda Triangle?” the Cert Pool 
and Its Influence over the Supreme Court’s Agenda, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 105, 109 (2001) 
(describing the majority of cases that make it into the Supreme Court’s cert pool as vastly 
“‘frivolous,’ particularly those filed in forma pauperis by prisoners,’” which are “not worthy 
of the Court’s time”). 
66 See, e.g., Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 598 (7th Cir. 2003) (Ripple, J., concurring) 
(federal courts have been “overburdened by meritless lawsuits brought by prisoners”); 
Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 312 (3d Cir. 2001) (describing “the heavy volume 
of frivolous prisoner litigation in the federal courts”); In re Perry, 223 B.R. 167, 169 (B.A.P. 
8th Cir. 1998) (prisoners flood the courts with prisoners’ rights litigation); Nicholas v. 
Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[F]ederal courts spend an inordinate amount of 
time on prisoner lawsuits, only a very small percentage of which have any merit.”). 
67 Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the Provision of 
Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 437 (1993). 
68 Tucker v. Branker, 142 F.3d 1294, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (assessing the rational basis 
underlying the PLRA for purposes of Equal Protection challenge). Several authors have 
challenged the conclusion that dismissal before trial speaks to a claim’s frivolousness. See 
Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners’ Rights: Congress and the Supreme 
Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229, 1295–96 (1998) (stating that because the Supreme 
Court has “narrow[ed] the definition of rights and raises the procedural hurdles for relief, 
prisoners are bound to lose more cases,” and as a result, unsuccessful claims are not 
necessarily “unworthy,” but simply “unsuccessful”). 
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Another critique aimed at prisoner-brought cases is the lack of 
opportunity cost related to bringing them.69 That is, prisoners have 
nothing better to do, so the risk of spending their endless free time on 
pointless suits is high. Even when the Supreme Court mentions its 
commitment to the fair treatment of prisoner-brought cases, it qualifies 
its message, reminding us of the cases’ categorical lack of merit.70 
B. Reclassifying Prisoner-Brought Cases 
A metric that looks beyond the antagonism71 with which the 
judiciary approaches prisoner litigation is needed. Classifying prisoner 
litigation within the greater framework of the work that federal courts 
do is one way to consider whether they are a good use of Article III 
time. Doing away with generalizations about the merits of prisoners 
and prisoner litigation creates the opportunity to look to the essence of 
the claims that prisoners bring. 
A preliminary question, then, is what should Article III judges be 
doing with their time?72 In 1990, reducing the federal caseload was a 
 
69 Tucker, 142 F.3d at 1301; see also Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 234 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(explaining that prisoners “often have free time on their hands that other litigants do not 
possess,” and, as a result, “the federal courts have observed that prisoner litigation has 
assumed something of the nature of a ‘recreational activity’” and that “there has been a far 
greater opportunity for abuse of the federal judicial system in the prison setting”). This 
particular line of attack is perplexing when applied to prison condition claims, which, in this 
Author’s experience, (1) requires prisoners to prioritize civil litigation over efforts that 
might lead to overturning their criminal conviction, (2) gives a prison custodian notice that 
he or she is a named defendant with personal exposure in a civil suit, and (3) requires access 
to paper, pen, mail, and, in some instances, a law library. The opportunity costs are 
potentially quite high, assuming that prisoners’ civil rights complaints can be written and 
filed despite prisons’ increasingly frequent use of solitary confinement and lockdowns for 
both punitive and non-punitive reasons. 
70 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007). The Jones proclamation that most prisoner-
brought conditions of confinement claims mostly “have no merit” is oft-cited. See, e.g., 
Crayton v. Graffeo, 10 F. Supp. 3d 888, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2014); McLean v. United States, 566 
F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2009); Muhmmad v. Stanford, No. 7:11CV00610, 2012 WL 112199, 
at *1 n.5 (W.D. Va. Jan. 12, 2012); Brown v. Austin, No. 05 CIV. 9443 (PKC), 2009 WL 
613316, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2009). Of course, prisoner-brought cases may be plentiful 
because prison condition violations are also plentiful. And they may be more likely to fail 
pretrial because incarcerated pro se parties cannot adequately prosecute their claims, 
regardless of the claims’ merits. 
71 See Joseph T. Lukens, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Three Strikes and You’re 
Out of Court–It May Be Effective, but Is It Constitutional?, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 496 
(1997) (“[G]iven the extreme number of prisoner civil rights petitions, even the judiciary 
can become antagonistic towards this class of litigants, and therefore less likely to exert 
much effort to find the next . . . proverbial needle in the haystack.”). 
72 Exactly what Article III judges should be doing “is a painful but critical question.” 
Daniel J. Meltzer, The Judiciary’s Bicentennial, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 433 (1989). 
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serious concern, just as it remains twenty-five years later.73 Professors 
Chemerinsky and Kramer proposed reducing the federal caseload by 
determining the “ideal” scope of federal jurisdiction, and narrowing the 
category of cases that needed to be heard in federal court accordingly.74 
Acknowledging that appointment of additional federal judges was 
unlikely, they ranked the cases most and least worthy of Article III 
attention.75 To reduce the federal caseload, the scope of federal 
jurisdiction had to shrink.76 What they developed was a “minimal” 
model of federal jurisdiction, which included cases “whose resolution 
in federal courts should be uncontroversial.”77 
Chemerinsky and Kramer prioritized four categories of cases that 
should unequivocally be decided in federal courts: cases involving 
separation of powers, cases by or against the United States, cases by or 
against foreign governments, and cases implicating disputes between 
state governments.78 Also included in the category of cases that deserve 
federal jurisdictional priority were cases in which state prisoners 
challenged their custody through habeas corpus.79 The authors 
explained that because the federal remedy exists to “prevent mistakes 
in the state courts,” providing a remedy through federal review must 
necessarily mean that the review occur in federal courts.80 
The authors debated whether cases involving individual 
constitutional rights were as worthy of federal jurisdiction as the other 
categories of cases.81 These cases include prisoners’ section 1983 
actions.82 Section 1983 is the vehicle through which a prisoner can, for 
 
73 Moore, supra note 11, at 1179–80 (summarizing the concern about “increases” in the 
federal caseload voiced by the American Bar Association, Congress, and the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules). Moore rejects the assumption that the federal caseload has 
increased through a revealing and exhaustive review of the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts’ data. She concludes that “since 1986, instead of an ‘explosion’ of the 
civil docket, we have seen the opposite—if not quite an implosion, at least stagnation.” Id. 
at 1180. 
74 See Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 
1990 BYU L. REV. 67, 74 (1990). 
75 Id. at 75. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 77. 
78 Id. at 88–89. 
79 Id. at 89. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 91–92. 
82 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Montano v. Hedgepeth, 120 F.3d 844, 848 (8th Cir. 
1997) (“A bulwark for individual liberties, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides legal redress to 
individuals who suffer violations of their federal rights at the hands of any ‘person’ who acts 
‘under color’ of state law.”); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 134 (3d Cir. 
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example, sue anyone who “caused a violation of the prisoner’s Eighth 
Amendment rights while acting under color of state law.”83 Professor 
Chemerinsky deemed individual constitutional rights cases as “among 
the nation’s most important litigation,” and concluded that federal 
jurisdiction over such cases was necessary.84 Professor Kramer instead 
sought to categorize such cases as deserving of the option of a federal 
forum, that is, that they should enjoy “permissive” federal 
jurisdiction.85 Cases involving “nonconstitutional federal questions” 
were ranked as less important than the previously-described cases, but 
were ranked of greater importance than diversity cases, which were 
deemed least in need of federal jurisdiction.86 As a result, under the 
Chemerinsky/Kramer sorting, both prisoner-brought habeas petitions 
and those involving section 1983 civil rights claims deserve federal 
jurisdiction. In the case of habeas petitions, federal jurisdiction is 
necessary. 
Other scholars who have suggested ways in which to reduce the 
federal caseload have similarly attacked diversity jurisdiction. A year 
before the Chemerinsky/Kramer proposal, Professor Meltzer suggested 
that it was time to consider curtailing diversity jurisdiction.87 However, 
his reduction proposal did not compromise federal jurisdiction over 
prisoner-brought claims. He argued that if federal jurisdiction were to 
be limited, Article III’s reduced capacity should be reserved, at least in 
part, to protect constitutional and federal statutory rights most likely to 
be brought by “disfavored” plaintiffs.88 Disfavored or unpopular 
plaintiffs include “prisoners or people who have interactions with 
police that give rise to misconduct claims”; in other words, those whose 
claims are viewed suspiciously as soon as they are filed.89 
Neither the Chemerinsky/Kramer nor the Meltzer proposal expressly 
states that reserving federal jurisdiction for certain cases means 
reserving Article III attention for the same. However, it is fair to read 
this inference into their proposals. In a more recent article, Professor 
 
1985) aff’d, 482 U.S. 656 (1987) (stating that section 1983 encompasses a broad range of 
actions sounding in tort, including injuries under color of state law to a person or his property 
and infringements of individual liberties). 
83 Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 2010). 
84 See Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 74, at 91. 
85 Id. at 91. 
86 Id. at 92–93. 
87 Meltzer, supra note 72, at 434. 
88 Id. at 433. 
89 Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy Between 
Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 262 (1997). 
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Williams has categorized prisoner-brought cases as “petitions that 
legitimately seek to enforce constitutional and statutory protections of 
fundamental liberties.”90 That is, he gives prisoner-brought cases a 
heightened status in the same way that Chemerinsky and Kramer did. 
He contends that because of the claims such cases involve, they should 
not be relegated to non-Article III court staff, including “magistrates, 
agency judges, staff attorneys, permanent law clerks, or other shadow 
judiciary personnel.”91 
Seen through this lens, prisoner-brought cases, though disdained by 
federal judges, are worthy of both federal jurisdiction and Article III 
judicial attention. 
III 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE DELEGATION OF 
PRISONER CASES TO PRO SE STAFF 
It is not enough to label the transfer of responsibilities from Article 
III judges to pro se staff as delegation to successfully challenge the 
practice. This Article goes further and questions the constitutionality of 
the transfer of judicial power to pro se staff on a very specific ground. 
The delegation, which is authorized by local procedure, is an improper 
use of the federal courts’ rulemaking power. In other words, the local 
procedure governing pro se prisoners’ civil litigation goes beyond the 
limited rulemaking authority Congress has given the federal courts. As 
explained above, district courts delegate pro se cases to pro se staff 
through local rules, general orders, or informal practices. Each category 
of district court procedure arguably constitutes an improper and 
overbroad use of courts’ limited rulemaking power. This Article 
presents a new application of the doctrine that when federal courts 
make rules, they may act only within the limited authority delegated to 
them by Congress.92 
 
90 Victor Williams, A Constitutional Charge and a Comparative Vision to Substantially 
Expand and Subject Matter Specialize the Federal Judiciary: A Preliminary Blueprint for 
Remodeling Our National Houses of Justice and Establishing a Separate System of Federal 
Criminal Courts, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 535, 661 (1996). 
91 Id. 
92 Scholarship in this area has focused almost exclusively on the impact of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which apply in all federal district courts. See, e.g., David Marcus, 
Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 
UTAH L. REV. 927 (2011); Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules 
Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47 (1998); Linda S. Mullenix, The 
Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992). The scholars 
that have addressed the problem of overbroad local rulemaking have focused on the local 
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Congress has delegated its rulemaking authority to the district 
courts, but only for the purpose of creating local rules of procedure.93 
Local rules may create a separation of powers issue when they conflict 
with Congress’s judgment about procedure.94 This principle is 
embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83’s (Rule 83) 
requirement that local rules be consistent with federal statutes.95 As 
explained below, there are federal statutes that expressly provide for 
judicial decision-making in prisoner cases. Yet the district courts have 
taken it upon themselves to delegate to pro se staff tasks that Congress 
had already assigned to judges. The district courts are not empowered 
to create procedure that conflicts so directly with Congressional 
rulemaking. 
The procedure that delegates judicial power to pro se staff arguably 
violates Rule 83’s consistency principle in three different ways. First, 
the procedure is inconsistent with the Rules Governing Section 2254 
Cases in the United States District Courts (the 2254 Rules).96 In habeas 
corpus cases, pro se staff have assumed duties that the 2254 Rules 
expressly leave to judges. The default adjudicator in section 2254 cases 
is a district court judge; a magistrate judge may take over a district court 
judge’s duties, but only within the limits authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 
636.97 The 2254 Rules do not grant any adjudicatory power to pro se 
staff. 
Indeed, the 2254 Rules are clear that the initial screening of a 2254 
habeas corpus petition is to be performed by a judge.98 They also 
provide that it is a “judge” who must, if the petition is not dismissed, 
“order the respondent to file an answer, motion, or other response 
 
rules and procedure enacted following the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA). See, 
e.g., Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Expressly Repudiating Implied Repeals Analysis: A New 
Framework for Resolving Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, 51 
EMORY L.J. 677, 683–84 (2002). 
93 See Linda J. Rusch, Separation of Powers Analysis As A Method for Determining the 
Validity of Federal District Courts’ Exercise of Local Rulemaking Power: Application to 
Local Rules Mandating Alternative Dispute Resolution, 23 CONN. L. REV. 483, 487 (1991); 
see also Steven Flanders, Local Rules in Federal District Courts: Usurpation, Legislation, 
or Information, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 213, 216 (1981). 
94 Rusch, supra note 93, at 497. 
95 FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1). 
96 The 2254 Rules were promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). Beaird v. 
Joslin, No. 3:05-CV-1833KBH, 2006 WL 2473338, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2006) report 
and recommendation adopted, No. 3:05CV1833 K, 2006 WL 2459378 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 
2006). “A local rule must be consistent with—but not duplicate—federal statutes and rules 
adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075.” FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1). 
97 R. GOVERNING SEC. 2254 CASES IN THE U.S. DIST. CTS. 10. 
98 Id. at R. 4. 
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within a fixed time, or to take other action the judge may order.”99 By 
creating local procedure that delegates judicial tasks to nonjudicial pro 
se staff, district courts have acted inconsistently with federal law. 
Second, when local procedure gives pro se staff the responsibility to 
screen pro se prisoner complaints after the complaints are filed, that 
procedure also conflicts with federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires 
that “[w]hen a prisoner seeks redress from a government defendant in 
a civil action,” the complaint be screened “by the Court.”100 Screening 
requires “[t]he court” to “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any 
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil 
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or 
officer or employee of a governmental entity.”101 
While “the court” might include anyone working in the district court 
who acts at the district court’s general behest, cases interpreting section 
1915A are clear that screening is a judicial task. The default adjudicator 
at the screening stage is a district court judge. A recent District of 
Nevada case criticizing a magistrate judge’s entry of an order 
dismissing a complaint under section 1915A illustrates this point. 
Absent party consent, the magistrate judge only had authority to enter 
a report and recommendation.102 The district court reviewed the 
magistrate judge’s screening order and found it to be analogous to an 
order entered after “motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim” 
because the screening order would have the same impact on the case’s 
ultimate disposition.103 The court explained that a screening order 
either terminates a plaintiff’s claim or “forces the plaintiff to replead” 
and, without party consent, screening could not be delegated to a 
magistrate judge.104 Therefore, delegating the screening to pro se staff 
is inconsistent with what Congress envisioned would occur in the 
screening process. 
Third, for the same reasons, when local procedure assigns screening 
to pro se staff, it is inconsistent with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 
 
99 Id. 
100 Sudler v. Danberg, 635 F. Supp. 2d 356, 358 (D. Del. 2009); see also Elder v. 
Swarthout, No. 2:14-CV-0892 DAD P, 2015 WL 4730370, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2015) 
report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:14-CV-0892 WBS DAD, 2015 WL 5286717 
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2015) (explaining that the court “is required to screen all actions brought 
by prisoners who seek any form of relief, including habeas relief, from a governmental entity 
or officer or employee of a governmental entity”). 
101 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) (2012). 
102 Dollar v. Gutierrez, 111 F. Supp. 3d 1114, 1118 (D. Nev. 2015). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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The Act requires that in prisoner civil rights actions a court “shall on 
its own motion or on the motion of a party dismiss any action brought 
with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . by a prisoner 
. . . if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary 
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”105 It further 
“requires the Court to screen the plaintiff’s complaint for the purpose 
of identifying claims subject to immediate dismissal.”106 
There is no suggestion that the “court” mentioned in any of the 
prisoner-specific federal rules or statutes means anyone that works for 
the Court. Therefore, the local procedure that delegates the initial 
screening of habeas corpus petitions and prisoner civil rights actions to 
pro se staff conflicts with congressional intent.107 This kind of local 
procedure is rulemaking that federal courts are not empowered to 
undertake. 
The structural error created by an overbroad use of the federal 
courts’ rulemaking authority is no less severe if it occurs within formal 
or informal local procedure. Local rules of civil procedure must comply 
with Rule 83.108 Rule 83 requires that local rules be adopted and 
amended according to the process it sets forth.109 Rule 83 also governs 
 
105 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
106 Hunter v. Augusta Richmond Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. CV 106-58, 2006 WL 
1982937, at *1 (S.D. Ga. July 12, 2006) (emphasis added); see also Davis v. Jersey City 
Police Dep’t, No. CIV. 15-1880 KM MAR, 2015 WL 1268311, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2015) 
(“Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act . . . district courts must screen complaints in those 
civil actions in which a prisoner . . . brings a claim with respect to prison conditions.”); 
Adkins v. Shinn, No. CIV. 14-00156 LEK, 2014 WL 3726143, at *1 (D. Haw. July 24, 
2014) (“Federal courts must screen all civil actions brought by prisoners seeking redress 
from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, and dismiss a claim or complaint if it is 
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 
immune from such relief.”); Castano v. Nebraska Dep’t of Corr. Servs., No. 4:98CV3007, 
1999 WL 1442028, at *1 (D. Neb. June 11, 1999) (“Under 1997e(c)(1), a district court must 
screen prisoner complaints and dismiss those that fail to state a claim, are frivolous or 
malicious or seek monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.”). 
107 Even if local procedure does not conflict with the plain meaning or legislative intent 
of rules or statutes, at least one scholar has suggested that it may still violate the consistency 
principle. In this way, a local rule would conflict with Congress’s purpose if it “allows a 
district court to make a judgment about procedure which Congress should make.” See 
Rusch, supra note 93, at 502–03. 
108 FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1) (describing the notice and opportunity for comment required 
for new or amended rules, the proportion of district judges in a district that must approve of 
a new or amended rule, when new rules or amendments take effect, and to whom new rules 
or amendments must be furnished). 
109 Id. 
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the content of local rules.110 A local rule may only govern the district 
court’s practice.111 Moreover, Rule 83 expressly provides that local 
rules must be consistent with, but not duplicative of, federal statutes.112 
Rule 83’s consistency principle, and its limit on the scope of a federal 
court’s rulemaking authority, applies with equal force to procedure not 
contained within local rules. Rule 83 controls the scope of so-called 
“local-local” rules, a shorthand label for a judge’s own rules of 
practice.113 An individual judge, just like the district as a whole, may 
only regulate procedure consistent with federal law.114 
The Advisory Committee notes suggest that Rule 83 is also meant 
to govern the “multiple directives” employed by district courts to 
“control practice,” including judges’ individual rules of practice, as 
well as “internal operating procedures” and standing orders.115 As the 
Eleventh Circuit has stated, if the purpose of local procedure is to 
“control practice in a district court,” then the label affixed to the 
procedure in question should not guide its analysis; rather, any such 
practice must still follow Rule 83.116 That is, what a district court 
cannot do by local rule it also cannot do by way of a procedural device 




112 Id. (“A local rule must be consistent with—but not duplicate—federal statutes and 
rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075 . . . .”). Rule 83’s notion that a district court 
may prescribe rules for the conduct of its business has been described as a restatement of 
the district courts’ inherent power. Flanders, supra note 93, at 213 n.2. The same inherent 
power has been described as a power that is not governed by “rule or statute,” but instead 
by “the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the 
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–
31 (1962). But see G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 
(7th Cir. 1989) (citing both Link, 370 U.S. at 629–30 and FED. R. CIV. P. 83 as support for 
the existence of a court’s inherent power to exercise discretion even when the federal rules 
do not authorize or describe “a particular judicial procedure”). District courts’ power over 
practice and procedure has also been traced to “the grant of judicial power in article III,” 
which purportedly includes the inherent power to regulate practice and procedure. Rusch, 
supra note 93, at 487 (distinguishing the inherent procedural power from the courts’ 
“fundamental” powers related to the exercise of judicial power, powers “necessary to the 
exercise of all others,” “essential powers implied by the Constitution,” and “powers 
belonging to a court merely because it is a court”). 
113 Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 63, 66 
(2015) (“Standing orders, sometimes referred to as ‘local-local rules,’ are issued by 
individual judges as opposed to the district court as a whole.”). 
114 FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b) (stating that a judge’s individual rules must also be consistent 
with the judge’s district’s local rules). 
115 FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee’s note to 1995 amendment. 
116 See Brown v. Crawford Cty., 960 F.2d 1002, 1009 (11th Cir. 1992). 
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general orders, and hidden procedure described above must all be 
consistent with federal laws. When local procedure is inconsistent with 
federal laws, no matter what form the procedure takes, it creates a 
separation of powers problem. 
IV 
POLICY PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE DELEGATION OF PRISONER 
CASES TO PRO SE STAFF 
Local procedure that delegates judicial tasks to pro se staff does 
more than create separation of powers problems. It also violates an 
identifiable federal policy that disfavors delegation of judicial tasks to 
actors who are not Article III judges. This policy is present in several 
Supreme Court cases addressing the constitutionality of the delegation 
of Article III’s judicial power to bankruptcy judges, who do not enjoy 
life tenure or fixed compensation. It also appears in the criticism aimed 
at delegation of the authorship of appellate opinions to law clerks and 
staff attorneys. Finally, the policy is enforced in reported cases that 
reviewed proceedings in which district court law clerks acted as proxies 
for Article III judges during pretrial hearings and trial. There, the 
delegation was overwhelmingly condemned. 
A. Claims That Cannot Be Delegated 
Delegation of Article III power has received significant scrutiny in 
bankruptcy cases, which may include some claims that do not require 
Article III adjudication, alongside claims that do require Article III 
adjudication. If Congress creates legislation that vests the Article III 
judicial power over Article III claims in non-Article III actors, the 
delegation may create a structural error. 
Article III vests the federal judicial power in certain courts117 and 
also determines who may sit on those courts.118 In addition, Article III 
provides that the judicial power may only be exercised by those who 
 
117 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”). 
118 Id. (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices 
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”); N. 
Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 (1982) (“The ‘good 
Behaviour’ Clause guarantees that Art. III judges shall enjoy life tenure, subject only to 
removal by impeachment,” whereas “[t]he Compensation Clause guarantees Art. III judges 
a fixed and irreducible compensation for their services”). 
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enjoy life tenure and fixed compensation.119 These judicial 
qualifications are meant to ensure judicial branch independence and 
permit judges to be free from the pressure that might otherwise be 
exerted on them by the remaining branches.120 In addition, the 
requirements protect litigants by providing a forum and an adjudicator 
“free from potential domination” by others.121 Still, the right to an 
Article III judge with life tenure and a fixed salary is not absolute.122 
Congress may, in some instances, delegate certain decision-making to 
non-Article III judges without creating constitutional problems.123 
The modern doctrine regarding delegation of the judicial power to 
judges who do not enjoy life tenure and fixed compensation begins with 
United States v. Will, decided in 1980.124 There, the Supreme Court 
struck down a law through which Congress repealed previous 
legislation giving federal judges cost-of-living pay increases.125 In 
finding a Compensation Clause violation, the Court emphasized that 
the Clause is aimed at promoting judicial independence.126 
Moreover, the Court traced the roots of the Compensation Clause to 
Hamilton’s concern for protecting judicial pay127 and the Act of 
Settlement of 1701, which sought to “correct abuses prevalent under 
the reign of the Stuart Kings” by, inter alia, giving judges “ascertained 
and established” salaries.128 Though colonial judges originally enjoyed 
salary protection and life tenure, by 1761 they served at the pleasure of 
the King.129 This “interference” would lead the Framers to ensure that 
“both the tenure and the compensation of judges would be protected 
from one of the evils that had brought on the Revolution.”130 Since 
Will, cases addressing Article III judicial power delegation have 
emphasized the importance of judicial independence. 
 
119 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 582 (1985). 
120 N. Pipeline Const. Co., 458 U.S. at 59. 
121 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (quoting 
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 847. 
124 449 U.S. 200 (1980). 
125 Jonathan L. Entin & Erik M. Jensen, Taxation, Compensation, and Judicial 
Independence, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 976 (2006). 
126 Will, 449 U.S. at 218. 
127 Id. (“‘In the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s subsistence 
amounts to a power over his will.’”). 
128 Id. (quoting 12 & 13 Will. III, ch. 2, § III, cl. 7 (1701)). 
129 Id. at 219. 
130 Id.; Entin & Jensen, supra note 125, at 977. 
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Delegation issues have arisen frequently in bankruptcy cases. In 
1982’s Northern Pipeline v. Marathon decision,131 the Court addressed 
whether Congress, through the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, had conferred 
Article III’s judicial power to bankruptcy judges who did not enjoy life 
tenure or salary security.132 The bankruptcy judges received 
jurisdiction “over all matters related to those arising under the 
bankruptcy laws,” a delegation that violated Article III by giving the 
bankruptcy judges power that only Article III judges could enjoy.133 
The delegation of Article III’s judicial power to judges with 
periodical appointments compromised judicial independence.134 The 
Court emphasized that this cannot be allowed: “our Constitution 
unambiguously enunciates a fundamental principle—that the ‘judicial 
Power of the United States’ must be reposed in an independent 
Judiciary.”135 It saw no need to create courts and judges outside of 
Article III’s purview for matters “related to those arising under the 
bankruptcy laws,”136including the appellant’s “right to recover 
contract damages to augment its estate.”137The Court also rejected the 
argument that Congress could create courts with judges not subject to 
Article III’s constraints simply because there was a need for such courts 
to adjudicate claims arising under specialized legislation.138 
Following Northern Pipeline, Congress limited its delegation of 
Article III power to bankruptcy judges.139 The scope of bankruptcy 
judges’ power depended on whether the subject matter of a claim in 
front of a bankruptcy judge was “core” or “non-core” to a bankruptcy 
proceeding.140 Distinguishing between these two categories proved 
difficult.141 However, in non-core matters, bankruptcy judges could 
only conduct hearings and submit proposed findings of fact to district 
courts to review the findings de novo following a party’s objection.142 
 
131 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
132 Id. at 52, 53, 60. 
133 Id. at 76. 
134 Id. at 58. 
135 Id. at 60. 
136 Id. at 76. 
137 Id. at 71. 
138 Id. at 72–73. 
139 Robin Kar, What Can Bankruptcy Law Tell Us About Article III and Vice Versa?, 60 
MONT. L. REV. 415, 435 (1999). 
140 G. Marcus Cole & Todd J. Zywicki, Anna Nicole Smith Goes Shopping: The New 
Forum-Shopping Problem in Bankruptcy, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 511, 518 (2010). 
141 See id. 
142 Kar, supra note 139, at 435–36. 
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Stern v. Marshall, a 2011 decision, addressed whether a bankruptcy 
judge could render a final judgment in a “core” proceeding involving a 
common law tort counterclaim.143 The Court held that, although 
legislation permitted a bankruptcy judge to do so, the Constitution did 
not.144 Constitutionally, a bankruptcy judge improperly exercises the 
judicial power by entering final judgment on a state common law tort 
claim.145 The Court emphasized the importance of keeping the judicial 
power with those who, through life tenure and fixed compensation, 
would render decisions without concern about “currying favor with 
Congress or the Executive.”146 The integrity of the judiciary would be 
jeopardized, the Court explained, if Congress could confer judicial 
power on non-Article III actors.147 
Stern prohibited Congress from altering who wields Article III 
judicial power by forbidding Congress from assigning away any claim 
brought within federal jurisdiction “made of ‘the stuff of the traditional 
actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789.’”148 
This category is commonly understood to mean claims that were the 
subject of suit “at the common law, or in equity, or in admiralty.”149 
Article III judges in Article III courts must decide them.150 
Such matters include “the mundane as well as the glamorous, 
matters of common law and statute as well as constitutional law.”151 
The Court resoundingly refused to give weight to the argument that its 
holding, which would limit the work bankruptcy judges could do, 
would delay bankruptcy and render it more costly.152 Instead, it noted 
that there is no constitutional pass given to a law or procedure that is 
“efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of 
government.”153 
 
143 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 469 (2011). 
144 Id. at 485. 
145 Id. at 487. 
146 Id. at 494. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id.; see also Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855) 
(stating that Congress cannot “withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from 
its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty; nor, on the 
other hand, can it bring under the judicial power a matter which, from its nature, is not a 
subject for judicial determination”). 
150 Stern, 564 U.S. at 494 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 
458 U.S. 50, 86–87 (1982)). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 506. 
153 Id. (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)). 
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The Stern position that efficiency concerns should not win out over 
structural ones was eviscerated in Wellness International Network 
Limited v. Sharif.154 In 2015, just four years after Stern, Wellness 
International also addressed the constitutionality of delegation to 
bankruptcy judges. However, Stern notwithstanding, in response to a 
constitutional challenge, Wellness paid homage to efficiency and 
convenience, stating that “without the distinguished service” of 
bankruptcy and magistrate judges, “the work of the federal court 
system would grind nearly to a halt.”155 Departing from Stern, the 
Court held that “Article III is not violated when the parties knowingly 
and voluntarily consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy judge,” no 
matter if the claim is one that the Constitution gives litigants the right 
to be adjudicated by an Article III judge.156 Moreover, the consent need 
not be express, but can be implied.157 Therefore, had the Stern parties 
consented to the bankruptcy judge’s entry of a final judgment in the 
claim at issue, the Wellness International decision would have 
endorsed it.158 
Central to the Court’s latest bankruptcy delegation pronouncement 
is the notion that bankruptcy judges provide “able assistance” to Article 
III judges.159 Congress could “rest the full share of the Judiciary’s 
labor” on individuals who qualify for bankruptcy judgeships, but has 
not because, according to the Court, to do so “would require a 
substantial increase in the number of district judgeships.”160 
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent emphasized that party consent is no 
cure for a constitutional violation; a party, he wrote, “has no authority 
to compromise the structural separation of powers or agree to an 
exercise of judicial power outside Article III.”161 Echoing his majority 
opinion in Stern, Roberts again noted that “practical considerations of 
efficiency and convenience cannot trump the structural protections of 
the Constitution,” even if the Congressional incursion into Article III 
 
154 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2015). 
155 Id. at 1938–39. 
156 Id. at 1939. 
157 Id. at 1947. 
158 Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent argues that the majority could have avoided the 
question of whether “private parties may consent to an Article III violation.” Id. at 1950 
(Roberts, J., dissenting) (noting that the claim at issue in Wellness International stemmed 
from the bankruptcy itself, and therefore was not the type of claim that required Article III 
adjudication). 
159 Id. at 1946. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 1954 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
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is “de minimis.”162 Nevertheless, Wellness International’s majority 
opinion is the law: consent can in fact cure a structural constitutional 
violation.163 
Wellness International ultimately permitted a structural error to be 
cured through party consent. However, its careful development of a 
party consent standard demonstrates commitment to the policy that 
Article III judicial power should generally remain with Article III 
judges. 
B. Opinions That Cannot Be Delegated 
Much attention has been devoted to delegation of appellate opinion 
writing, which also raises concerns about improper delegation of the 
Article III power. These concerns are anchored in institutionalized 
notions of who should be responsible for certain tasks. 
In the context of appellate opinion writing, the concern over who 
writes important decisions intersects with concerns about litigants’ 
increased reliance on decisions that were marked as unpublished. In 
1964, the Judicial Conference decided that “only opinions of ‘general 
precedential value’” would be published.164 In 2006, the Federal Rules 
of Appellate Procedure were amended to permit citation of unpublished 
opinions.165 As a result of the rule change, “circuit courts can no longer 
forbid lawyers to cite back to the[] decisions they have made but 
 
162 Id. at 1959. 
163 Wellness International addressed, but did not ultimately turn on, the distinction 
between public and private rights. See id. at 1957–67 (2015) (Roberts, J. dissenting). The 
public rights doctrine allows Congress to establish legislative courts and administrative 
agencies to adjudicate cases involving “public rights.” N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982). Although the distinction between “public rights” and 
“private rights” has not been well-defined, it is clear that a public right arises “between the 
government and others.” Id. at 69. Traditionally, private rights—generally speaking, matters 
between two private parties—must be adjudicated by an Article III judge. Id. at 69–70. The 
claims at issue in this Article (habeas and civil rights) avoid the public versus private rights 
distinction because they are not being pulled between legislative and Article III courts. 
Instead, they are claims arguably adjudicated by nonjudicial staff working within an Article 
III court. 
164 Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of 
How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 401, 414–15 (2013). 
165 Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff 
Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 2–5 (2007). Pether does not challenge 
the assumption that staff attorney and law clerk work is second-rate. Instead, her article 
tackles the “discriminatory origins” of what she refers to as “institutionalized 
unpublication.” Id. at 7. 
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designated ‘not for publication,’ nor sanction them if they do.”166 
Given the way all opinions are now in fact published, at a minimum, in 
some kind of electronic format, describing them as published or not is 
a distinction that makes little sense. 
Still, there was significant judicial opposition to the seemingly 
innocuous change to the appellate rules.167 One explanation for the 
outsized reaction is the judicial perception that unpublished opinions 
lack importance. In theory, unpublished opinions do not create new 
law; instead, they represent decisions in routine matters and therefore 
merely affirm preexisting precedent.168 But why worry about 
permitting citation to another kind of carefully drafted judicial writing? 
Perhaps because the unpublished decisions did not actually represent 
judicial writing. Refocused this way, the resistance to unpublished 
opinions begins to look like a resistance to opinions written by 
individuals who are not Article III judges. 
Many of the judges who opposed the new citation rule believed that 
unpublished appellate opinions were authored “predominantly [by] 
recently-graduated corps of judicial clerks and staff attorneys,” 
individuals who are not meaningfully supervised.169 These opinion 
authors were described as “‘kids that are just out of law school.’”170 
Their work was understood to be “sloppy or wrong.”171 One author has 
suggested that “[c]lerks and staff attorneys are more likely than judges 
to make factually or legally wrong findings because they have missed 
or misinterpreted something where a more thoroughly trained or more 
experienced person might not have done.”172 This statement’s accuracy 
is not the point.173 The perception is that citable appellate opinions 
should be written by Article III judges because Article III judges are 
more likely to get the law right. 
 
166 Id. at 8–9. 
167 FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(d). 
168 Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81, 
111 (2000). 
169 Pether, supra note 165, at 10. 
170 Id. at 6. 
171 Id. at 17. 
172 Id. at 39–40. 
173 For example, under different circumstances, including access to the paths that 
privilege opens up, many staff attorneys might have become Article III judges. 
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C. Tasks That Cannot Be Delegated 
Like the resistance to giving increased stature to appellate opinions 
authored by law clerks and staff attorneys, there is significant 
discomfort when law clerks take on typically judicial tasks at the 
district court level. Judges should be presiding over cases, not their law 
clerks. Writing in 1981, Wade McCree, an esteemed former federal 
trial and appellate judge, and then Solicitor General, warned against 
increasing the number of law clerks working for federal judges.174 He 
worried that an increase in the number of law clerks would encourage 
an increase in the “critical aspects” of judicial work delegated to the 
new law clerks.175 Honing in on the Article III implications of such a 
practice, he also warned that “excessive delegation poses a threat to the 
traditional institutional structure of the judicial office.”176 Judge Posner 
has summarized the problem with over-delegation to law clerks: a law 
clerk cannot try a case for a judge because such delegation would 
convert law clerks into judges.177 
There are several reported examples of law clerk conduct that too 
closely resembled judicial action. A law clerk cannot rule on whether 
a victim’s testimony can be read back to the jury, nor can he or she 
preside over the readback.178 Such an error is so significant that it 
renders the trial in which it occurs unfair.179 At least one court has 
criticized a judge’s decision to allow a law clerk to “settle” issues 
 
174 Wade H. McCree, Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 
787 (1981). 
175 Id. at 789. 
176 Id. 
177 Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1046 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(Posner, J., dissenting). Posner noted that if “Congress abolished all Article III judgeships 
as they fell vacant till only one Article III judge was left, and it then authorized a thousand 
law clerks to assist that judge in discharging his burdensome duties. There would no longer 
be an independent federal judiciary; the clerks would be the judges.” Id. at 1052. 
178 Parker B. Potter, Jr., Law Clerks Gone Wild, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 173, 184–85 
(2010) (citing Riley v. Deeds, 56 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
179 Riley v. Deeds, 56 F.3d 1117, 1118 (9th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that such an error is 
structural and will result in the granting of a habeas corpus petition). The court refused to 
review such an error for abuse of discretion because the standard “presupposes the trial judge 
exercised some judicial discretion in the matter under review” and that in the underlying 
criminal case, the “judge was not present when the jury requested that the testimony be read 
back, nor does the record reflect he was consulted about the matter;” instead, the “law clerk 
made the decision to grant the jury’s request to read back the testimony.” Id. at 1120. 
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involving jury instructions.180 A law clerk also may not preside over a 
final pretrial conference181 or handle peremptory challenges.182 
Courts have often rejected losing parties’ arguments that a decision 
should be reversed because law clerks were acting as de facto judges 
on the grounds that the allegations were untrue.183 Still, courts have 
noted that if such allegations were true, they would constitute examples 




There are different ways to solve the problems identified in this 
Article. The first option is the most sweeping: the elimination of all 
formal and informal local procedure that assigns judicial tasks to 
nonjudicial actors in prisoner litigation. Each district courts’ local 
procedure is already subject to potential abrogation by the relevant 
circuit judicial council.185 The judicial councils could, if they so 
desired, amend or abrogate the problematic local procedure. 
Congress, which has already legislated the issue of who must take 
certain adjudicative action in prisoner civil rights and habeas cases, 
 
180 United States v. Sloan, 811 F.2d 1359, 1361 n.2 (10th Cir. 1987) (explaining that 
“instructions were settled with a law clerk and not the judge,” even though “the judge must 
resolve all the issues pertaining to the instructions, for it is the sole responsibility of the 
judge to see to it that the jury is correctly instructed upon the law”). However, Sloan does 
not define exactly what settling entails, and it may encompass the type of law clerk 
activity—researching applicable law and drafting the final jury instructions—that today 
would be unlikely to raise eyebrows. 
181 Sanders v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 193 F.3d 1080, 1082 (9th Cir. 1999) (Tashima, J., 
concurring) (“[A] pretrial conference is a judicial proceeding and a judicial proceeding can 
be conducted only by a judicial officer.”). 
182 See United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300, 1313 n.4 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[R]eliance 
on law clerks or other court personnel to handle the peremptory challenges with the attorneys 
is generally considered improper.”). 
183 Potter, supra note 178, at 207–09. 
184 See, e.g., United States v. Keiser, No. 305-CR-80, 2006 WL 3751452, at *3 (D.N.D. 
Dec. 19, 2006) (rejecting pro se defendant’s claims “that law clerks frequently act as de 
facto judges, that judges inappropriately delegate non-delegable duties to their law clerks 
and that law clerks have usurped the duties of Article III judges,” but noting that “each of 
these complaints, if real, would constitute a serious abuse of the law clerk system and would 
be grounds for grave concern”). 
185 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2012). However, given the prevalence of local rules that arguably 
conflict or duplicate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is unclear whether judicial 
councils are engaging in meaningful review of local rules. See Walter W. Heiser, A Critical 
Review of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
California, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 556 (1996). 
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would be the branch left to decide whether additional amendments to 
already-existing federal law are needed. Congress could choose to 
amend the Prison Litigation Reform Act and the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act to delegate pre-pleading motion review of 
prisoner complaints and other judicial responsibilities to pro se staff. 
Though the measures Congress has adopted by no means help 
prisoners,186 the legislation that controls prisoner civil rights and 
habeas litigation was subject to rigorous public debate.187 This far-
reaching solution would cure the structural error created by local 
procedure that conflicts with federal law. It would eliminate practices 
that exceed federal courts’ rulemaking authority. Any new practices, if 
legislatively created, would also be subject to the rigorous debate most 
federal legislation receives. 
However, eliminating local procedure that assigns judicial tasks to 
nonjudicial actors might also create a workload crisis in the federal 
district courts. Many of the tasks performed by staff attorneys would 
be reassigned to district and magistrate judges. The Supreme Court has 
recently warned that even structural errors should not be resolved by 
rulings that create chaos and overburden the federal judiciary. 
In Wellness International, the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
delegation of Article III claims to a non-Article III judge created a 
separation of powers problem.188 However, instead of invalidating the 
legislation that created the separation of powers issue, the Court created 
a way to cure the structural error. The Court was informed by its 
concern that if the delegation at issue were prohibited, “the work of the 
federal court system would grind nearly to a halt.”189 That is, the large 
volume of claims decided by bankruptcy judges would need to be 
decided by Article III judges. As a result, it announced that the 
structural error could be cured if the parties knowingly and voluntarily 
 
186 See Katherine A. Macfarlane, Adversarial No More: How Sua Sponte Assertion of 
Affirmative Defenses to Habeas Wreaks Havoc on the Rules of Civil Procedure, 91 OR. L. 
REV. 177, 182–83 (2012) (describing how the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act made the chances of having a habeas petition granted infinitesimal); Margo Schlanger, 
Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1563 (2003) (stating that, as a result of federal 
litigation aimed at prisoner civil rights’ claims, even “constitutionally meritorious cases 
[were] . . . made more difficult both to bring and to win”). 
187 See, e.g., Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 131 (1st Cir. 1998) (describing the 
debates and reports surrounding the passage of AEDPA); Hall v. McCoy, 89 F. Supp. 2d 
742, 745 n.4 (W.D. Va. 2000) (describing the debates and reports surrounding the passage 
of the PLRA). 
188 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2015). 
189 Id. at 1938–39. 
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consented to the practice190 through express or implied consent.191 The 
Court avoided a ruling that would have required “a substantial increase 
in the number of district judgeships.”192 
Therefore, a less drastic solution to the problems identified in this 
Article would permit delegation of judicial tasks to nonjudicial actors 
if parties consented to the delegation. This would avoid a workload 
crisis resulting from the reassignment of tasks currently performed by 
pro se staff. Moreover, this solution would simply require district 
courts to employ procedures already used in other contexts. District 
courts are familiar with procedures that require party consent because 
they must create and enforce such procedures when magistrate judges 
assume adjudicative responsibilities in lieu of district judges.193 The 
same party consent procedures could be adopted whenever staff 
attorneys take on arguably judicial tasks. The procedures already in 
place that allow parties to object to magistrate judge findings could also 
be used in the context of pro se staff adjudication. 
District courts might also consider eliminating pro se staff positions. 
When prisoner cases are sent to special offices controlled by staff that 
hear only one type of case, there are risks that the individuals handling 
those cases develop routine practices that do not distinguish between 
claims that are meritless and those that are meritorious. A great deal of 
bias already surrounds prisoner litigation. Segregating prisoner cases 
by assigning them to decision makers who only hear prisoner cases will 
often hurt the prisoners, even if the practices enforced are arguably 
more efficient. The elimination of staff attorney positions would cause 
prisoner cases to be treated like other civil cases. 
Pursuant to this proposal, federal district judges and law clerks 
would continue to manage and decide a diversified docket, but that 
docket would include prisoner cases. Unless certain cases, like prisoner 
cases, are carved out for disparate treatment, district judges hear cases 
across every possible subject area that federal jurisdiction reaches. 
Cases filed in federal court are presumptively assigned to district 
judges on a random basis. There are sound reasons for this practice. No 
case becomes too routine, no subject area more familiar or less exciting 
than another. 
 
190 Id. at 1939. 
191 Id. at 1947. 
192 Id. 
193 See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2012). 
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With respect to prisoners, if their cases are mixed in with all other 
cases district judges decide, as opposed to being singled out for special 
treatment and nonjudicial adjudication, it might be harder to make 
assumptions about the claims prisoners bring, and the kind of plaintiffs 
prisoners are. For example, a request for an extension caused by a delay 
in prison mail would be measured against other non-incarcerated 
parties’ extension requests and those requests’ reasonableness. The 
request would not be polluted by assumptions based on historical 
knowledge of a particular prison’s mail delivery habits, or assumptions 
about that particular prison’s inmate population. Prisoner cases and the 
issues that they give rise to would become less routine and arguably 
receive a less biased review. 
The positions currently designated as pro se staff positions could be 
converted into law clerk positions. These law clerks would work inside 
a judge’s chambers. Their status would be equal to that of the judge’s 
elbow law clerks. As a result, the individuals conducting the research 
and drafting orders in prisoner cases would be closely supervised by 
judges. 
At a minimum, staff attorney judging should be brought out of the 
shadows. There is no reason to treat delegation in prisoner cases any 
differently than the delegation that garnered attention in, for example, 
bankruptcy litigation. Delegation does not become inscrutable in cases 
in which the plaintiffs are incarcerated. In fact, this Article argues, the 
claims that prisoners are bringing are arguably some of the most 
important kinds of federal litigation, cases in which delegation to 
nonjudicial actors should be less, and not more, common. 
If district courts assign adjudicative tasks to staff attorneys, that shift 
should only occur through procedures that are described in detail in 
local rules, which must be amended and adopted following public 
notice and opportunity for public comment.194 Pro se staff duties 
should not be more detailed in difficult-to-locate position descriptions. 
If the staff attorney position survives, staff attorneys themselves 
should be identified in district court directories. This would give some 
kind of notice about the volume of nonjudicial stuff working on 
prisoner litigation. If staff attorneys are supervised by a senior staff 
attorney, that senior staff attorney should also be identified. No 
prisoner should struggle to determine who is deciding his or her claims. 
 
194 FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1). 
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CONCLUSION 
The recommendations reached in this Article may be criticized for 
disrupting the hierarchy of who does what in the federal courts. If pro 
se staff positions are eliminated, district judges and magistrate judges 
will need to take on the sometimes tedious work required to decide pro 
se prisoner litigation. District court work is already characterized as 
less prestigious than that assigned to appellate courts.195 This Article 
also proposes that a practice that has largely been shielded from public 
scrutiny, perhaps purposefully so, needs to be made public. Both 
suggestions will assign prisoner litigation valued status—which federal 
courts are reluctant to give it. 
But that is no reason to back away from the problem. At least one 
scholar has observed that when appellate courts delegate opinions 
involving asylum requests to non-Article III actors, the practice has 
“structurally subordinating effects” as the cases get “second-class 
treatment that is likely to produce injustice.”196 The cases receiving 
lesser treatment “tend to be those which federal appellate judges find 
distasteful, or irksome,” including “postconviction appeals, appeals 
from pro se litigants, civil rights cases, including those brought by 
prisoners, and asylum and immigration appeals.”197 District court 
practices should not be immune from the same scrutiny. 
Moreover, there is a robust tradition of criticizing federal courts’ 
habit of justifying exactly which actor decides a given case by placing 
subjective value on the case itself. In other words, this Article is not the 
first to criticize widely held beliefs that some cases are not worthy of 
an Article III judge’s time. Professor Resnik has argued that referring 
to certain cases as “complex,” and therefore deserving of Article III 
attention, distinguishes them from comparatively “little cases,” which 
quickly become labeled routine and less worthy of “special skill or 
 
195 See Pauline T. Kim et. al., How Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 
29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 89 (2009) (noting that district judges “work in a very different 
environment than court of appeals judges do” and that they are “the first responders in a 
judicial system open to a growing number of claimants”); see also Richard B. Saphire & 
Michael E. Solimine, Diluting Justice on Appeal?: An Examination of the Use of District 
Court Judges Sitting by Designation on the United States Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 351, 396–97 (1995) (stating that district judges “deal with litigants, witnesses, 
and the whole range of actors who populate the trial process, while the circuit judge is rarely 
required to relate, on a personal level, with these actors” and “district judges are individual 
decision makers whereas circuit judges are collegial decision makers”). 
196 Pether, supra note 165, at 17. 
197 Id. at 27. 
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authority.”198 Cases deemed trivial or small will be sent to “less visible, 
less well-resourced, and less prestigious” adjudicators.199 Resnik 
draws comparisons between housekeeping, “the province for women 
during the nineteenth century,” which was consequently devalued, and 
“the activities of trial court judges,” which has been devalued and 
ignored as it “increasingly becom[es] the domain of Article I 
judges.”200 
Prisoner litigation has been devalued, but unfairly so. That 
devaluation has protected the delegation described in this Article and 
shielded it from significant scrutiny despite the potential for structural 
error. A robust structural challenge based on rulemaking authority, 
however novel, offers a new way to reign in local procedure that 
punishes prisoners with second-class practices. The procedure 
analyzed in this Article targets a disfavored, voluminous category of 
federal civil litigation. Given its significant impact on both the 
prisoner’s wellbeing and on our justice system as a whole, there is even 
more reason to take a closer look. 
  
 
198 Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 58 
(1991). 
199 Id. at 59. 
200 Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial 
Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909, 913–14 (1990). 
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Table 2. Miscellaneous Sources Identifying Pro Se Staff in Ninth Circuit 
District Courts201 
District Source Staff Mention 
Alaska Representing Yourself in 
Alaska’s Federal Court 
handbook202 
The handbook is “the result of . . . 
many hours of work by dedicated 
professionals,” including “Diane 
Smith, this Court’s Pro Se Staff 
Attorney, who primarily drafted 
the handbook and compiled the 
materials included within it.” 






“The staff attorney selected . . . 
will be supervised by the Senior 
Staff Attorney and will perform 
substantive review, research, and 
writing in prisoner civil rights and 
habeas corpus cases.” 
James McKay is “the Senior Staff 
Attorney in the . . . District of 
Arizona . . . . James has been a 
member of the Ninth Circuit Pro 
Se Committee for six years. He 
also serves on the District of 




Judicial Clerkships and 
Externships205 
“Pro Se and Death Penalty Staff 
Attorney positions are usually 
full-time, career positions and 
become available only upon the 
departure of a staff attorney or 
through the allocation of new 
positions by the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts.” 
 
201 To locate mentions of pro se staff in, for example, the District of Arizona, I searched 
using the following terms: “District of Arizona staff attorney” and “District of Arizona pro 
se law clerk.” Similar searches were conducted for each district. 
202 Representing Yourself in Alaska’s Federal Court (The Pro Se Handbook), U.S. DIST. 
COURT FOR THE DIST. OF ALASKA, http://www.akd.uscourts.gov/sites/akd/files/prose 
_handbook_2012_0216.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
203 Job Posting, Pro Se Staff Attorney−Phoenix or Tucson, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE 
DIST. OF ARIZ., http://agency.governmentjobs.com/azduscourts/job_bulletin.cfm?JobID=7 
87543 (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
204 Presenter Biographies, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF ARIZ., http://www.azd 
.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/%5BB%5D%20Presenter%20Biographies.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
205 Judicial Clerkships and Externships, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE CENT. DIST. OF 
CAL., https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/employment/judicial-clerkships-and-externships (last 
Oct. 14, 2016). 
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Announcement Pro Se 
Law Clerk206 
“The incumbent will . . . support 
[U.S. Magistrate Judges Grosjean 
and Boone] by conducting 
extensive research and writing on 




Applying for Judicial 
Externships, Pro Se 
Department 
Information207 
“Pro Se Department externs assist 
the Pro Se Department staff 
attorneys in managing prisoner 
habeas corpus and civil rights 




Application Info, Pro Se 
Law Clerks208 
“These [pro se law clerk] 
positions are usually full-time 
permanent positions and become 
available only upon the departure 
of the law clerk currently holding 
that position or through the 
allocation of new positions by the 
Administrative office of the U.S. 
Courts.” 
Guam n/a  
Hawaii n/a  
Idaho n/a  
Montana District of Montana 
Local Rules 
Committee209  
Pro Se Law Clerk identified as ex 
officio member of the court. 
Nevada United States District 
Court, District of 
Nevada, State of the 
Court 2001210 
“The pro se staff attorney section 
of the district now has a total of 
six lawyers, two of whom are 
assigned to the capital habeas 
corpus section.” 
“Between the Reno and Las Vegas 
 
206 Pro Se Law Clerk Opportunity Announcement #2015-24, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE 
E. DIST. OF CAL. http://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caednew/assets/File/2015-24PSLC%20 
Fresno(1).pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
207 Applying for Judicial Externships, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF CAL., 
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/externships (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
208 Law Clerk/Externship Application Info, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF CAL., 
https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/Job%20Listings/SitePages/LawClerkExternInfo.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
209 In re: Appointment of the Local Rules Committee, Order (D. Mont. 2015), 
http://www.mtd.uscourts.gov/sites/mtd/files/Order%20Appointing%20LR%20Committee 
.pdf. 
210 State of the Court 2001, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF NEV. (2001) 
http://www.nvd.uscourts.gov/Files/PN_Nevada_District_Report.pdf. 
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District Source Staff Mention 
offices in Calendar Year 2001, the 
staff attorneys generated 
approximately 900 orders 
regarding in forma pauperis status 
and content screening” and that 
“the Las Vegas and Reno staff 
attorneys also generated in excess 
of 800 draft orders regarding post-
service issues: matters relating to 
discovery, case management, and 










Job opening, Job Details 
for Pro Se Law Clerk211  
The Western District of 
Washington was hiring a law clerk 
to “provid[e] assistance on 
prisoner cases including reviewing 
complaints and petitions, 
conducting necessary research and 
preparing recommendations and 





211 Job Posting, Job Details for Pro Se Law Clerk, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE W. DIST. 
OF WASH. (on file with author). 
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